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Impact of Governance Structures on Environmental Disclosures in the 
Middle East and Africa 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study investigates the impact of corporate governance structures on 
environmental disclosure practices in the Middle East and Africa. 
Design/methodology/approach – The research model uses a panel dataset of 121 publicly 
listed (non-financial and non-utility) firms from 11 Middle East and African (MEA) countries 
over the period 2010–2017, employs alternative dependent variables and regression techniques, 
and is applied to various sub-groups to improve robustness. 
Findings – The empirical results strongly indicate that MEA firms with high governance 
disclosures tend to have better environmental disclosure practices. The board characteristics of 
gender diversity, size, CEO/chairperson duality and audit committee size impact positively on 
MEA firms’ voluntary environmental disclosures, whereas board independence has a negative 
influence. 
Research limitations/implications – This study advances research on the relationship between 
corporate governance structures and environmental disclosure practices in MEA countries, but 
is limited to firms for which data are available from Bloomberg. 
Practical implications – The results have important practical implications for MEA 
policymakers and regulators. Given the positive impact of board gender diversity on firms’ 
environmental disclosures, policy reforms should aim to increase female directors. MEA 
corporations aiming to be more environmentally friendly should recruit females to top 
managerial positions. 
Originality value – This is thought to be the first study to provide insights from the efficiency 
and legitimation perspectives of neo-institutional theory to explain the relationship between 
MEA firms’ internal governance structures and environmental disclosures. 
Keywords: Corporate governance structures; environmental disclosures; board characteristics; 
Middle East and Africa. 
Paper type: Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
The Middle East and African (MEA) region has a rich array of natural resources. In 2017, it 
had 55% of the world’s oil reserves (43% of global production), 48% of gas reserves (24% of 
global production), and 1.4% of coal reserves (4.1% of global production) (British Petroleum, 
2018). These rich natural resources have increased the region’s strategic importance, and have 
led to rapid economic transformation and development (Al-Rawashdeh et al., 2015). However, 
these major changes have raised serious concerns about environmental and public health in the 
MEA region. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2016), air pollution is the 
main cause of various deadly illnesses (especially stroke and heart disease), and MEA countries 
are among the worst affected by air pollution, while the World Bank ranks seven MEA 
countries among the 20 experiencing the highest per capita CO2 emissions from energy 
consumption (World Bank, 2014). Nevertheless, positive actions have been taken by MEA 
countries to address these issues and improve environmental governance, management, 
policies and regulations. For example, South Africa’s National Environmental Management 
Act, 2008 aimed to enhance environmental governance and management practices, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has launched a strategic 
plan to increase the use of renewable sources to 50% by 2050 (Official Portal of the UAE 
Government, 2018). MEA countries have also started to work closely with the US 
Environmental Protection Agency to improve “environmental governance, water pollution and 
water security, clean fuels and vehicles, public participation, and pollution prevention” (EPA, 
2018). However, so far very little academic research on environmental governance and 
management has been conducted for the MEA region (Gerged et al., 2018). This study 
examines the impact of governance structures (composite governance index and board 
characteristics) on the environmental disclosures of publicly listed firms in the MEA region, 
using theoretical insights from the efficiency and legitimation perspectives of neo-institutional 
theory. 
Previous studies (e.g. Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007; Walls et al., 2012; Haque and Ntim, 2018) 
suggest that corporations’ institutional actors (e.g. governing board) and context may prompt 
them to voluntarily increase disclosures of environmental information. Neo-institutional theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001; Judge et al., 2010) predicts that social, political and 
economic institutional pressures may facilitate and/or restrain the diffusion of good 
environmental practices among corporations. Such pressures are driven by two key factors: 
efficiency and legitimation (Cormier et al., 2005; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Haque and 
Ntim, 2018). Neo-institutional theory has previously been employed in country-level analyses 
to explain institutional forces that may facilitate and/or restrain the implementation of good 
practices, including the adoption of good governance, corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and international accounting practices (e.g. Chizema and Buck, 2006; Zattoni and Cuomo, 
2008; Judge et al., 2010; Brammer et al., 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Shahab and Ye, 
2018). However, this theory has rarely been used to explain the main institutional drivers of 
the diffusion of good environmental practices at the corporate level. 
Accordingly, this study employs and extends the neo-institutional theoretical perspective to 
explain the main drivers of voluntary environmental disclosures at the corporate level, focusing 
specifically on the theoretical implications of the legitimation and efficiency perspectives. The 
legitimation perspective suggests that normative, mimetic and coercive institutional pressures 
(i.e. pressures from legal mandates, group norms and stakeholders on which corporations 
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depend) may force corporations to comply with good practices in order to meet the expectations 
of the wider community and legitimise their activities (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Salama et 
al., 2011; Brammer et al., 2012) by committing to good environmental practices, including 
increased disclosure (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Deegan, 2014). Greater environmental 
disclosure may also improve corporate legitimacy by maintaining good relations with powerful 
stakeholders (trade unions, creditors/bondholders, students, government and employees) and 
winning their support (Hasseldine et al., 2005; Haque and Ntim, 2018). 
Similarly, the efficiency perspective of neo-institutional theory indicates that institutional 
pressures may increase corporate competition for crucial resources to maintain sustainable 
operations and protect shareholders’ interests (Toms, 2002; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). This 
view proposes that greater commitment to environmentally responsible activities/strategies in 
the form of improved environmental disclosures may improve corporations’ operational 
efficiency by reducing related costs and increasing access to vital resources, such as business 
contracts and finance (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). It may also improve corporate efficiency 
by minimising information asymmetry between different stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; De Villiers et al., 2011). Given the complex nature and outcomes of environmental and 
governance practices (Parker, 2005; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Shahab and Ye, 2018), there 
is growing agreement that these practices need investigation, drawing on insights from both 
the legitimation and efficiency perspectives of neo-institutional theory (Zattoni and Cuomo, 
2008; Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014). 
Empirical studies of voluntary environmental disclosures and their determinants are scarce 
(Wasiuzzaman and Mohammad, 2020) and have several weaknesses. First, despite empirical 
and theoretical suggestions that corporate decisions relating to disclosures, including 
environmental ones, are influenced mainly by the structure of top management teams 
(McGuinness et al., 2017), few studies examine the impact of board characteristics on 
environmental disclosure practices (Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007; Cong and Freedman, 2011; 
Walls et al., 2012; Haque and Ntim, 2018). Rather, existing studies tend to focus on the impact 
of board characteristics on firm value (Judge et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008), executive pay (Hong and Minor, 2016; Ntim et al., 2017; Elmagrhi et al., 
2018b), and governance, financial and social disclosures (Mallin, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005; Khan et al., 2013; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). Second, studies of environmental disclosure 
practices have been conducted largely in developed and emerging countries (McGuinness et 
al., 2017; Elmagrhi et al., 2018a), paying little attention to the MEA region (Akrout and 
Othman, 2013; Juhmani, 2014). However, the former tend to have different legal, political, 
regulative, cultural and economic systems from the latter (Ali et al., 2017), which may 
differently influence corporate disclosure behaviours. For example, Gerged et al. (2018) and 
Shahbaz et al. (2015) suggest that lack of regulatory enforcement in MEA countries may 
impact on their environmental disclosure practices. Third, the few extant studies of the MEA 
region are largely descriptive (Dawkins and Ngunjiri, 2008; Amran and Haniffa, 2011; 
Eljayash et al., 2012; Gerged et al., 2018), and focus on the effect of general corporate 
attributes (e.g. profitability and age) on voluntary environmental disclosure practices 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Ahmad et al., 2019). Furthermore, previous studies of the MEA 
region (Karim et al., 2006; Rizk et al., 2008; Habbash, 2016) examine the impact of only a 
small number of internal governance mechanisms on environmental disclosure practices, and 
no previous study appears to examine the impact of broader measures of governance quality 
using a composite index. 
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Given these notable gaps in previous research, this study contributes to the literature in several 
ways. First, whereas previous environmental disclosure studies are largely 
descriptive/qualitative (Rizk et al., 2008; Habbash, 2016), this study offers seven-year 
longitudinal evidence on the extent and determinants of voluntary environmental disclosures 
by 121 firms from 11 MEA countries. Second, whereas most previous studies focus on the 
impact of general corporate attributes, this study offers new evidence on the extent to which 
internal governance structures influence the level of voluntary environmental disclosure 
practices by investigating the impact of several under-researched internal governance 
mechanisms. Finally, this study contributes new insights from the efficiency and legitimation 
perspectives of neo-institutional theory to better explain the impact of internal governance 
structures on environmental disclosure practices. 
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 presents the theoretical background, Section 3 reviews 
the empirical literature and develops the research hypotheses, Section 4 outlines the data and 
research design, Section 5 discusses the empirical results, and Section 6 draws some 
conclusions. 
2. Theoretical background 
This paper responds to a need to extend neo‐institutional theory using more current 
explanations of power, interests and value perceptions to critically analyse organisational 
change and innovation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Scott, 
2001; Damayanthi and Gooneratne, 2017). While conventional institutional theory emphasises 
inertia and path dependence, neo‐institutional theory seeks to identify the determinants of 
organisational flexibility and change, reflecting a range of coercive and consensual strategies 
to achieve change across an organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However, full 
and uncontested institutionalisation is rare, and interests and power play a role in determining 
how organisations adapt to their institutional environments. For example, Oliver (1991) notes 
that because institutional environments are not always unitary and organisations are not always 
passive, organisations respond to institutional pressures according to their resource 
dependencies. Goodstein (1994) suggests that organisations respond strategically to 
institutional pressures, depending on their motivations, resource dependencies, idiosyncratic 
constraints and incentives. Thus, structural isomorphism has fundamental implications for 
profitable organisations, since it may signal effective and productive structures and processes 
with diffused best practices (Damayanthi and Gooneratne, 2017). 
Although the neo-institutional theoretical framework has successfully been applied in previous 
country-level studies (Chizema and Buck, 2006; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Judge et al., 2010; 
Brammer et al., 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Shahab and Ye, 2018) to explain potential 
institutional drivers of corporate practices, including the adoption of good governance, CSR 
and international accounting practices, it has rarely been employed to explain the main 
institutional factors that facilitate and/or constrain the implementation of good environmental 
practices at the corporate level. This study employs the neo-institutional legitimation and 
efficiency perspectives to explain the impact of institutional actors (governing board 
characteristics) on the environmental disclosures of 121 listed companies in the MEA region. 
From a legitimation perspective (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995), organisations 
must not only aim to provide services/goods and maximise shareholders’ wealth, but must also 
conform with the norms, values and expectations of broader society (Suchman, 1995). Failure 
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to do so may threaten their legitimacy and survival (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Neo-
institutional theory also proposes that organisations must demonstrate transparency and 
accountability to the wider community by incorporating socially expected and accepted norms, 
values and practices into their operations/activities (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Committing 
to good environmental practices through increased voluntary environmental disclosures may 
therefore improve corporate legitimacy by addressing broader societal concerns, and may help 
balance the conflicting informational needs of various stakeholders, and hence enhance 
corporate moral and rational legitimacy (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Overall, the 
legitimation perspective suggests that institutional actors, such as the governing board, may 
exert greater pressure on organisations to increase their environmental disclosures to conform 
with the norm, values and expectations of the wider community, and hence legitimise their 
organisational activities. 
In addition to seeking legitimacy, another key organisational objective is to improve efficiency 
to maximise financial performance (Toms, 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). The 
efficiency perspective of neo-institutional theory suggests that organisations comply with 
coercive, normative and mimetic pressures not only to improve their image/reputation, but also 
to gain competitive advantage, including securing access to crucial resources such as business 
contracts and finance (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Toms, 2002). Committing to greater levels 
of environmental disclosure may improve corporate efficiency by meeting powerful 
stakeholders’ expectations (e.g. providers of finance and resources) and obtaining their support 
to access crucial resources. Such commitment may also enhance corporate efficiency by 
minimising information asymmetry between stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Therefore, given that previous studies (Ruigrok et al., 2006; De Villiers et al., 2011; 
McGuinness et al., 2017; Haque and Ntim, 2018) find that governance and board structures 
significantly influence corporate strategic decisions, including those relating to commitment to 
and disclosure of environmentally friendly activities, this study employs the neo-institutional 
legitimation and efficiency perspectives to explain the extent to which governance structure 
and governing board characteristics influence the voluntary environmental disclosures of 121 
listed companies from the MEA region. 
3. Empirical literature and hypothesis development 
MEA countries have developed and transformed rapidly over recent years, mainly through oil, 
gas and coal production (Al-Rawashdeh et al., 2015), but at the expense of environmental and 
public health (World Bank, 2014; WHO, 2016). In response to these serious environmental and 
social threats, MEA countries have undertaken positive actions to improve environmental 
governance, management, policies and regulations. For example, South Africa issued new 
environmental protection laws and guidelines in 2008, and Egypt in 2009. However, lack of 
enforcement has led to poor implementation of these environmental reforms and measures 
(Shahbaz et al., 2015), so corporations may need to strengthen their internal governance 
structures, for example by appointing efficient corporate boards of appropriate size, diversity 
and independence. 
3.1 Corporate governance composite index and environmental disclosures 
The efficency perspective of neo-instutional theory suggests that complying with good 
governance polices and practices may mitigate agency problems and information asymmetry 
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through increased monitoring of management activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which 
may improve firms’ environmental disclosures. According to this view, firms tend to comply 
with good governance practices to demonstrate accountability to powerful stakeholders and to 
access crucial resources (Haque and Ntim, 2018), which may impact positively on their 
environmental disclosure practices. In addition, the legitimation perspective indicates that 
complying with good governance practices not only improves corporate efficiency, but may 
also pressurise firms to enhance their environmental disclosures to improve their reputation 
and image in the marketplace (Cong and Freedman, 2011). Therefore, the environmental 
disclosures of well-governed firms (firms with high governance scores) are expected to be 
better than those of their poorly-governed counterparts. 
Most previous empirical studies investigate the effect of corporate governance quality indices 
on firms’ financial performance, and report that well-governed firms tend to perform better 
(e.g. Gompers et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2009). However, empirical 
research on the association between corporate governance quality indices and environmental 
disclosure practices is lacking. Cong and Freedman’s (2011) study, the only one focusing on 
the US market, finds a positive relationship between a composite governance index and US-
listed firms’ environmental performance and disclosures. Hence, better-governed firms are 
expected to have better environmental disclosure practices than their poorly-governed 
counterparts in the MEA region. 
Hypothesis 1: Corporate governance quality index and the environmental disclosure practices 
of MEA firms are positively associated. 
3.2 Board structure and environmental disclosures 
This study examines the impact of five board characteristics (size, diversity and independence, 
CEO duality and audit committee size) on environmental disclosure behaviours. These five 
variables were selected because extant literature suggests that they may impact significantly on 
firms’ strategic decisions, including engagement in environmentally friendly activities 
(McGuinness et al., 2017; Haque and Ntim, 2018; Elmagrhi et al., 2018a). However, despite 
recognising the board of directors’ important monitoring role over corporate strategic 
decisions, previous studies largely investigate the impact of general corporate features (e.g. 
profitability, size and age) on environmental disclosure practices (Karim et al., 2006; Brammer 
and Pavelin, 2008; Ahmad et al., 2019). 
3.2.1 Board gender diversity and voluntary environmental disclosures 
Previous studies suggest that corporate board diversity significantly influences leadership 
efficiency and effectiveness (McGuinness et al., 2017; Francoeur et al., 2019), using attributes 
such as gender, ethnicity, age, religion, experience and educational background (Erhardt et al., 
2003; Ruigrok et al., 2007; Francoeur et al., 2019). This study focuses only on the impact of 
board gender on environmental disclosure behaviours, since data on other board diversity 
attributes are unavailable from Bloomberg. Theoretically, from a neo-institutional efficiency 
perspective, greater board gender diversity often enhances leadership efficiency and 
effectiveness by bringing diverse ideas, views, skills and experience into the boardroom, as 
well as improving board independence (Ruigrok et al., 2007; Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-
Sanchez, 2010). Similarly, the legitimation perspective indicates that greater gender diversity 
may enhance corporate reputation and image by broadening board discussions to incorporate 
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the perspectives of powerful stakeholders (Torchia et al., 2011), thereby strengthening 
connections with these influential stakeholders and facilitating access to crucial resources. 
Therefore, based on both efficiency and legitimation perspectives, it is argued that board gender 
diversity may pressurise managers to engage in higher levels of voluntary environmental 
disclosure. 
There is limited empirical evidence on the influence of board gender diversity on firms’ 
environmental disclosure practices, rather than on firms’ social responsibility disclosures 
(Williams et al., 2003; Barako and Brown, 2008; Zhang et al., 2013; Kyaw et al., 2017; 
Francoeur et al., 2019). Such studies have been conducted in the context of either developed 
(Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Ciocirlan and Pettersson, 2012; Glass et al., 2016; 
Ben-Amar et al., 2017) or emerging countries (Alazzani et al., 2017; McGuinness et al., 2017; 
Elmagrhi et al., 2018a). However, their findings suggest that board gender diversity has a 
positive influence on board independence and effectiveness, and that this may improve 
corporate environmental disclosure practices. No similar studies have been found relating to 
the MEA context. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2: Board gender diversity and the environmental disclosure practices of MEA 
firms are positively associated. 
3.2.2 Board size and voluntary environmental disclosures 
From a neo-institutional legitimation perspective, larger governing boards may better connect 
organisations with their external environment, because they are associated with more diverse 
stakeholder representation, experience, expertise and skills, thereby helping to attract critical 
resources, including finance (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Reverte, 2009). Greater stakeholder 
diversity may increase pressure on corporations to enhance their voluntary environmental 
disclosures to meet societal expectations (Burke et al., 2019; Zou et al., 2019). In contrast, the 
neo-institutional efficiency perspective suggests that larger boards are often associated with 
poor governance owing to coordination and communication problems (Yermack, 1996), which 
may impact adversely on corporations’ environmental disclosure practices. Therefore, 
corporations with larger boards may be less effective in protecting public interests, which may 
impact negatively on voluntary environmental disclosures. 
Empirical studies of the impact of board size on firms’ environmental disclosure behaviours in 
developed (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; De Villiers et al., 2011; Al-Shaer et al., 
2015; Dixon-Fowler et al., 2017) and emerging markets (Zou et al., 2015, 2019) reveal a 
positive influence. However, no previous study has been found that examines this relationship 
with respect to the MEA region. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 3: Board size and the environmental disclosure practices of MEA firms are 
positively associated. 
3.2.3 Board independence and voluntary environmental disclosures 
The neo-institutional legitimation perspective suggests that outsider directors tend to have 
greater incentives for increased transparency and accountability to the wider community, 
largely because they often are more objective and independent from management than insider 
directors (Zahra and Stanton, 1988). This may impact positively on voluntary environmental 
disclosures. The legitimation view also proposes that outsider directors are often appointed to 
represent the demands and protect the interests of multiple stakeholders (Ibrahim and 
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Angelidis, 1995), and consequently impose greater pressure on their organisations to increase 
their environmental disclosures to conform with the norms, values and expectations of the 
wider community, thereby legitimising their activities. In contrast, the neo-institutional 
efficiency view suggests that outsider directors are appointed primarily to represent and protect 
shareholders’ interests; hence, when stakeholders’ and shareholders’ interests conflict, outsider 
directors are expected to endorse board decisions in shareholders’ best interests, including 
those relating to disseminating more or less environmental information (Cramer and 
Hirschland, 2006). Therefore, outsider directors are less likely to act against board decisions, 
for example by revealing negative environmental information that might damage the 
company’s reputation and image in the marketplace (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 
2010). 
Previous empirical studies examine the impact of board independence on social (Zhang, 2012; 
Yekini et al., 2015; Jizi, 2017), financial (Chen and Jaggi, 2000) and general disclosure 
behaviours (Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008; Chau and Gray, 2010). Their findings suggest that 
the proportion of outsider directors relates positively to corporate voluntary disclosure 
practices. In contrast, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) report a negative and significant relationship 
between the proportion of outsider directors and social responsibility disclosures for 139 
Malaysian listed firms. However, few studies consider the impact of board independence on 
voluntary environmental disclosure behaviours. Rao et al. (2012) report a positive influence of 
board size and board independence on the environmental reporting of 96 publicly-listed 
Australian firms, whereas Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez’s (2010) sample of 283 firms 
listed on the FTSE Global Equity Index Series reveals a negative association between board 
independence and disclosure of greenhouse gas information. Based on the mixed evidence of 
previous theoretical and empirical literature, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 4: Board independence and the environmental disclosure practices of MEA firms 
are positively associated. 
3.2.4 CEO duality and voluntary environmental disclosures 
The neo-institutional legitimation perspective suggests that dual leadership may reduce board 
independence and effectiveness by allowing CEOs to implement strategies that increase their 
personal benefits at the cost of stakeholders, and by diminishing the board’s monitoring role 
over top management behaviour (Kim et al., 2009), thereby impacting negatively on voluntary 
environmental disclosures. In contrast, the efficiency perspective proposes that combining the 
chairperson and CEO roles may improve board efficiency by reducing the cost of 
communications among board members and speeding up decision-making processes (Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). In addition, dual leadership may improve corporate 
competitive advantage and growth opportunities by providing better business networks through 
CEO knowledge, talent and experience (Samaha et al., 2015), which may impact positively on 
environmental disclosure practices. 
Extensive empirical research on the impact of CEO duality, relating to general (Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2013) and social disclosures (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Jizi et al., 2014), produces mixed findings. For example, Jizi et al. (2014) 
report a statistically positive relationship between CEO duality and CSR disclosure for the 
largest US commercial banks. In contrast, using a sample of 167 Malaysian listed firms, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find no association between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure 
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practices, and for 177 Italian listed firms, Allegrini and Greco (2013) report a negative link. 
There is limited evidence of the impact of CEO duality on environmental disclosures, and most 
previous studies examine only listed firms in developed and emerging economies. For example, 
Mallin et al. (2013) and Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) report a positive 
association between CEO duality and corporate environmental disclosure practices. Therefore, 
based on the findings of previous environmental disclosure studies, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 5: CEO duality and the environmental disclosure practices of MEA firms are 
positively associated. 
3.2.5 Audit committee size and voluntary environmental disclosures 
Audit committees are considered to be an important internal governance mechanism for 
overseeing management actions, especially on issues relating to auditing, financial reporting, 
internal control and risk management (Raghunandan and Rama, 2003). Previous studies focus 
largely on the impact of audit committee characteristics, including presence, expertise, and 
frequency and size of meetings, on financial disclosure (Felo et al., 2003; Mangena and Pike, 
2005; Allegrini and Greco, 2013) and auditing practices (Carcello and Neal, 2000, 2003). In 
contrast, few studies examine the impact on voluntary environmental disclosures of audit 
committee characteristics in general, and audit committee size in particular (Al-Shaer et al., 
2015). However, given the importance of environmentally friendly activities and disclosures 
in managing corporate risk (Salama et al., 2011), which is the primary responsibility of audit 
committees (Al-Shaer et al., 2015; Yekini et al., 2015), audit committee characteristics are 
expected to influence corporate environmental disclosure practices. This study focuses mainly 
on the impact of audit committee size because data on this variable were available from 
Bloomberg for all sample firms. The neo-institutional legitimation perspective suggests that 
larger audit committees control and monitor managerial actions more effectively owing to 
greater expertise, skills and stakeholder representation (Chan and Li, 2008). This may increase 
pressure on corporations to make detailed disclosures of their environmentally friendly 
activities in order to legitimise their activities by fulfilling influential stakeholders’ 
expectations. Similarly, the neo-institutional efficiency perspective indicates that increased 
stakeholder representation, which is often associated with larger audit committees, may 
enhance corporate efficiency by providing better connections with the external environment 
(e.g. influential stakeholders), and thus access to crucial resources (Harrison, 1987). 
Much existing empirical literature examines the impact of audit committee size on firms’ social 
responsibility disclosures (Abbott et al., 2004; Song and Windram, 2004; Jizi et al., 2014; 
Yekini et al., 2015), with mixed findings. For example, Persons (2009) reports that the level of 
voluntary ethics disclosure is positively linked to audit committee size. However, Yekini et 
al.’s (2015) sample of 73 UK-listed firms reveals a negative link between audit committee size 
and social responsibility disclosures, and Abbott et al. (2004) and Bedard et al. (2004) report 
an insignificant association between audit committee size and voluntary corporate disclosures. 
Few studies examine the impact of audit committee size on environmental disclosure practices. 
For example, using a sample of UK FTSE 350-listed firms, Al-Shaer et al. (2015) report a 
positive and significant association between audit committee characteristics, including size, 
and firms’ environmental reputation. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 6: Audit committee size and the environmental disclosure practices of MEA firms 
are positively associated. 
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4. Research Methodology 
4.1 Data and sample 
The Bloomberg database was used as a source for the research sample and data on the research 
variables in this study. Bloomberg’s environmental score was used as an indicator of the extent 
of firms’ environmental disclosures. Bloomberg assesses the amount of environmental data 
that firms report publicly by considering every data point disclosed (e.g. air quality, climate 
change, water & energy management, and materials & waste) and then calculating annual 
environmental disclosure scores ranging from 0.1 (minimum) to 100 (maximum). Accordingly, 
several criteria were applied in constructing the sample. First, all publicly listed firms in MEA 
countries were taken into account, but companies incorporated outside the MEA region were 
excluded. Second, financial institutions (e.g. banks, insurers, pension funds and investment 
trusts) and utilities (e.g. gas, electricity and water) were removed, since they tend to have 
different capital structures and governance, disclosure and listing requirements (Elshandidy et 
al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2018a, 2018b), which may impact differently on environmental 
disclosures. Third, the sample was confined to firms for which environmental scores were 
available from Bloomberg. As a result of these selection criteria, the final sample consisted of 
587 firm-year observations from 121 unique (non-financial and non-utility) firms over the 
period 2010–2017. This sample period was used because Bloomberg environmental scores 
were unavailable for the majority of MEA region firms before 2010, and the most recent 
available data were for fiscal year 2017. 
Table 1 reports distributions of the firms by country, time and industry. The 121 firms were 
from 11 MEA countries: Botswana, Israel, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, UAE and Zambia (Panel A). However, numbers of unique firms ranged 
from one firm and four firm-year observations in Kenya, to 90 firms and 475 firm-year 
observations in South Africa. This is because the final sample was limited by the availability 
of environmental disclosure scores from the Bloomberg database. Furthermore, in order to 
alleviate any survivorship bias, the sample included companies that had been delisted (owing 
to business failure, mergers & acquisitions, etc.) or were first listed during the sample period. 
Hence, the number of firms selected increased over time (see Panel B of Table 1). Panel C 
illustrates the broad distribution of MEA firms across eight industries, classified according to 
the Bloomberg Industry Classification System (BICS): communications (10.7%), consumer 
discretionary (16.2%), consumer staples (21.8%), energy (2.7%), healthcare (6.5%), industrials 
(11.8%), materials (27.1%) and technology (3.2%). 
--Insert Table 1 about here-- 
4.2 Research design, model and variables 
To test the research hypotheses, a mathematical model and a set of variables were formulated 
to capture the effects of internal governance variables on the environmental disclosure practices 
of publicly-listed firms in the MEA region. As previously explained, Bloomberg’s 
environmental score was used as the dependent variable (E-SCORE) to measure firms’ 
environmental disclosure practices. Test variables were then defined, representing each of the 
six hypotheses. Bloomberg’s governance disclosure scores were employed as a proxy for firms’ 
corporate governance quality index (G-SCORE). Bloomberg evaluates the amount of 
governance data that firms report publicly, and calculates annual scores ranging from 0.1 for 
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firms revealing minimal governance information, to 100 for those disclosing every data point 
(board independence, structure & tenure, compensation, diversity and shareholders’ rights). To 
examine the impact of board characteristics on environmental disclosure practices, the 
proportion of female directors on the board (FEMDIR), board size (BSIZE), independent 
directors (BINDEP), CEO/chairperson duality (DUAL) and audit committee size (AUDIT) 
were used as independent variables. Consistent with previous studies (Hasseldine et al., 2005; 
Salama et al., 2012; Al-Shaer et al., 2015; Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan, 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 
2016; Kiesewetter and Manthey, 2017; Bacha and Ajina, 2020), the study controlled for insider 
ownership (INSIDER), institutional ownership (INST), profitability (ROA), debt ratio 
(DEBT), growth (GROW), firm size (FSIZE) and firm age (AGE). Finally, as the final sample 
was drawn from 11 MEA countries, representing eight broad industries and covering a 
relatively long time period (2010–2017), an attempt was made to control for country- and 
industry-specific effects and unobserved time-varying factors by including country 
(COUNTRY), industry (INDUSTRY) and year (YEAR) dummies in the research model. 
Definitions of all variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 2. 
--Insert Table 2 about here-- 
Accordingly, the main empirical model is specified as: 
E-SCOREi,k,t = αi  + β1G-SCOREi,k,t + β2FEMDIRi,k,t  + β3BSIZEi,k,t  + β4BINDEPi,k,t + 
β5DUALi,k,t + β6AUDITi,k,t + β7INSIDERi,k,t + β8INSTi,k,t + β9ROAi,k,t + β10DEBTi,k,t  + 
β11GROWi,k,t + β12FSIZEi,k,t + β13AGEi,k,t + ∑  𝑀𝑘=1 βkCOUNTRYi,t + ∑  
𝑁
𝑗=1 βjINDUSTRYi,k,t 
+ ∑  𝑇𝑡=1 βtYEARi,k + εi,k,t         (1) 
where i, k, t and j denote firm, country, year and industry, respectively. 
Although the sample covers 11 countries, the distribution of firms, and thus the number of firm-
year observations across countries, is not homogenous, the number of unique firms from South 
Africa being significantly larger than from other countries, potentially biasing the findings. To 
eliminate the impact of sample distribution heterogeneity across countries, the empirical model 
was applied to the MEA panel dataset using weighted least squares (WLS) regression, with 
weights calculated as the value of unity divided by the number of firm-year observations per 
country. 
5. Empirical results and discussion 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
Panels A and B of Table 3 present descriptive statistics for the research variables across the 11 
examined countries. These show that the mean (median) environmental disclosure score (E-
SCORE) of all firms in the sample is 26.22 (27.08), but means vary between countries from a 
minimum of 9.19 (Zambia) to a maximum of 30.23 (Qatar), while the lowest median score is 
4.65 (Saudi Arabia) and the highest 27.91 (South Africa). These scores seem realistic and are 
consistent with those reported by Gerged et al. (2018). The mean corporate governance 
disclosure score (G-SCORE) ranges from 39.73 (Qatar) to 58.72 (South Africa), with an 
average (median) value of 56.72 (57.14) for all firms, in line with Elgammal et al.’s (2018) 
findings. 
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The results reveal considerable differences in the mean and median values of each examined 
board characteristic variable across countries. For instance, the mean (median) for board 
independence (BINDEP) ranges from 0.219 (0.188) for Nigerian firms to 1.00 (1.00) for Omani 
firms, with a mean (median) of 0.573 (0.6) for the entire sample. Thus, the proportion of 
independent directors on boards is on average 57% in the investigated MEA firms. The average 
board size (BSIZE) is 11 directors (varying from a median of 8.0 for Oman and the UAE, to 
13.5 for Nigeria). Audit committees (AUDIT) generally comprise four directors (median of 4 
for all firms). The proportion of female directors is, on average, only about 19%, which 
suggests that the boards of public firms in the MEA region are male-dominated. The figures 
for DUAL reveal that the CEO is also the chairperson in only some firms in the UAE and South 
Africa, with an overall mean of 0.01 (1%). 
Panel B of Table 3 also provides information on firm-specific variables. The mean for 
institutional ownership (INST) of 0.549 exhibits a high ownership concentration, since 
institutional investors hold about 55% of the outstanding shares of the sampled MEA firms. In 
contrast, the proportion of stock ownership by insiders (INSIDER) is around 1% on average. 
Approximately 14% of the full sample of firms have debt financing (mean of 0.141 for DEBT) 
in their capital structure, with a 7% return on total assets invested (mean of 0.07 for ROA) 
between 2010 and 2017. The mean for growth opportunities (GROW) of 2.04 is twice as high 
as unity, suggesting that MEA firms had good investment prospects over the sample period. 
However, Table 3 also reveals differences between countries in the mean and median values 
of each ownership and financial characteristic. 
Univariate analysis was conducted to compare countries based on each research variable 
(Panels A and B of Table 3). One-way ANOVA tests and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests 
were used to determine whether differences between countries in the sample were statistically 
significant. Both parametric and non-parametric test results showed highly significant 
differences in environmental and governance disclosure scores, board, ownership and financial 
characteristics. However, this is unsurprising, given the 11 countries’ differing institutional 
settings, political and economic systems, legal structures and cultural values. 
--Insert Table 3 about here-- 
Table 4 reports the results of Pearson’s correlation matrix and variance inflation factor (VIF) 
values for the independent variables to check for multicollinearity. Although the results 
illustrate some significant correlations between the research variables, there is no high 
correlation between any two of them, and a few are moderately correlated. For example, the 
highest Pearson’s correlation figures for G-SCORE-INST, BINDEP-INST, BSIZE-FSIZE and 
ROA-GROW range from 30% to 45%. The VIF statistics also suggest no multicollinearity 
between the independent variables, since no VIF exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10. In 
fact, the VIF values are comparatively low, ranging from 1.04 to 1.42. 
--Insert Table 4 about here-- 
5.2 Regression analyses and discussion 
Table 5 shows the results of regression estimates to test the research hypotheses on the impact 
of corporate governance mechanisms on MEA firms’ environmental disclosure practices. 
Column 1 reports estimates for the full sample, Column 2 excludes South Africa, and Column 
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3 shows the estimates only for South Africa. Columns 4 and 5 display results for Middle-East 
and African firms, respectively. The research model was computed on the full sample and four 
different sub-samples in order to provide more robust findings and assess the consistency of 
the main findings across different dimensions. More specifically, South Africa has 
considerably more firm-year observations than other countries; thus, the model was run for the 
sample excluding South Africa and for South Africa alone to ensure that the main results were 
not dictated by this country’s data. In view of the countries’ dissimilarities, the sample was also 
stratified into two groups – Middle-Eastern firms (Column 4) and African firms (Column 5) – 
to check whether the findings differed significantly between these two regions. To control for 
potential sample distribution heterogeneity across countries and country groups, WLS 
regression was used (Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5), but pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression was performed in the single-country model for South Africa (Column 3). WLS and 
OLS estimations were computed using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity-robust regressions 
for all specifications. 
--Insert Table 5 about here-- 
At first glance, the results show that the F-statistics for each of the five regressions are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating the overall significance of the research model 
for the full sample and the sub-samples. The R2 values of estimated regression equations vary 
from around 52% to 79%, suggesting the research model’s good prediction power (goodness 
of fit). 
Column 1 of Table 5 reveals a positive and highly significant coefficient for G-SCORE (β1 = 
0.673, p < 0.01) for all MEA firms, which holds even after excluding South Africa from the 
regression (Column 2; β1 = 0.465, p < 0.01). Indeed, the coefficients of this variable are positive 
and statistically significant for all sub-samples (South Africa β1 = 0.536, p < 0.01; Middle East 
β1 = 0.500, p < 0.05; Africa β1 = 0.288, p < 0.01). This finding extends the limited existing 
evidence to the MEA region and shows that the corporate governance index score has a positive 
effect on MEA firms’ environmental disclosure practices. This is consistent with Cong and 
Freedman’s (2011) study and with the neo-institutional legitimation and efficiency 
perspectives, in that complying with good governance practices may increase pressure on firms 
to engage in environmentally friendly activities to demonstrate public accountability, enhance 
their reputation/image and win the support of powerful shareholders (Haque and Ntim, 2018). 
Therefore, the empirical results support Hypothesis 1. 
The results also reveal a strong and positive association between board gender diversity 
(FEMDIR) and environmental disclosure practices. The coefficients of FEMDIR are positive 
and statistically significant for the full sample (β2 = 0.251, p < 0.01) and for all sub-samples 
(non-South Africa β2 = 0.486, p < 0.01; only South Africa β2 = 0.125, p < 0.05; Middle East β2 
= 0.416, p < 0.10; Africa β2 = 0.230, p < 0.01). This is consistent with the findings of Elmagrhi 
et al. (2018a) and McGuinness et al. (2017) in China, and with several studies of developed 
markets (e.g. Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Ciocirlan and Pettersson, 2012; Glass 
et al., 2016; Ben-Amar et al., 2017). From the neo-institutional efficiency and legitimation 
perspectives, board gender diversity may improve board effectiveness through diverse ideas, 
views, skills and experience (Ruigrok et al., 2007; Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010), 
and may enhance corporate reputation/image by providing better connections with powerful 
stakeholders (Torchia et al., 2011). This may in turn increase managerial monitoring and 
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encourage firms to engage in greater levels of voluntary environmental disclosure (Elmagrhi 
et al., 2018a). Accordingly, the findings for MEA firms support Hypothesis 2. 
Column 3 of Table 1 reveals a positive effect of board size (BSIZE) on the environmental 
disclosure practices of South African firms, with a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for this variable (β3 = 0.554, p < 0.05). However, the coefficients of BSIZE in 
Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 are not significant, suggesting that board size has no influence on 
environmental disclosure for the full, non-South Africa, Middle East and Africa samples. This 
suggests that board size is important in helping increase the environmental disclosure practices 
only of South African firms. It also indicates that although South Africa has the largest number 
of firm-year observations in the sample, it does not dominate the estimates. The positive impact 
of board size on South African companies’ environmental disclosures is consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; De Villiers et al., 2011; 
Dixon-Fowler et al., 2017; Zou et al., 2015, 2019) and the legitimation perspective of neo-
institutional theory, in that larger boards encourage companies to engage more in voluntary 
environmental disclosures to satisfy the expectations of wider society, which in turn helps 
improve corporations’ legitimacy and image by maintaining good relations with powerful 
stakeholders. However, owing to the non-significant association for firms from the other 10 
countries, the results only partially support Hypothesis 3. 
In contrast, the regression estimates show a significant negative impact of board independence 
(BINDEP) on MEA firms’ environmental disclosure practices. The coefficients of BINDEP 
are negative and highly significant for all firms (β4 = −0.136, p < 0.01) and for the sample 
excluding South Africa (Column 2; β4 = −0.305, p < 0.01). The negative impact also holds 
across the sub-samples (South Africa β4 = −0.080, p < 0.05; Middle East β4 = −0.429, p < 0.01; 
Africa β4 = −0.079, p < 0.10). This inverse relationship may arise from independent directors 
being appointed for symbolic reasons (i.e. to meet the expectations of powerful stakeholders 
and wider society), making them less motivated to monitor managerial activities (Lambert et 
al., 1993), and negatively affecting firms’ environmental disclosures. In this respect, the 
empirical evidence is consistent with Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez’s (2010) findings and 
suggests that board independence is negatively associated with firms’ disclosures of 
environmentally friendly activities in the MEA region. Hence, Hypothesis 4 is rejected. 
The regression results also show a positive impact of CEO/chairperson duality (DUAL) on 
environmental disclosure practices for the full sample (β5 = 9.681, p < 0.05), but its effect varies 
across the sub-samples. The coefficients of DUAL are not significant for the Africa and South 
Africa sub-samples, but statistically significant for Middle Eastern firms (β5 = 19.381, p < 
0.05). The results contradict the neo-institutional legitimation view that dual leadership may 
reduce board independence and effectiveness, but are consistent with the efficiency view that 
combining the two roles may improve board efficiency (e.g. improving communications, 
speeding up decision making), which in turn positively affects environmental disclosure 
practices. Mallin et al. (2013) and Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) also report a 
positive relationship between CEO duality and firms’ disclosures of environmental practices. 
However, since this positive impact is not consistent across all MEA countries in the sample, 
the results only partially support Hypothesis 5. 
The coefficient of AUDIT in Column 1 is insignificant, which implies that audit committee 
size has no impact on MEA firms’ environmental disclosures. Nevertheless, this variable has 
statistical significance in some sub-samples: it is statistically significant and positive for non-
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South Africa (β6 = 3.643, p < 0.05), Middle East (β6 = 5.553, p < 0.05) and Africa (β6 = 1.120, 
p < 0.10), but not significant for South African firms. This suggests that audit committees are 
an important governance mechanism for improving MEA firms’ environmental disclosure 
practices. This positive impact is contrary to Abbott et al.’s (2004) and Bedard et al.’s (2004) 
reports of an insignificant association, and Yekini et al.’s (2015) reported negative link between 
audit committees and various corporate voluntary disclosures. Rather, there is a positive 
relationship between audit committee size and MEA firms’ environmental disclosure practices, 
apart from for South African firms, consistent with the legitimation and efficiency perspectives 
of neo-institutional theory and Al-Shaer et al.’s (2015) findings. Therefore, the results partially 
support Hypothesis 6. 
Finally, the results in Table 5 show that, apart from firm growth (GROW), the control variables 
(ownership and financial characteristics) have significant effects on MEA corporations’ 
environmental disclosure practices. Profitability (ROA) and debt level (DEBT) have a 
consistently negative impact, whereas firm size (FSIZE) and firm age (AGE) have strong 
positive effects on environmental disclosure practices across all MEA firms and countries. On 
the other hand, both ownership structure variables – insider (INSIDER) and institutional 
(INST) stock-holdings – exhibit a negative influence. However, this negative association does 
not hold for all MEA firms in the sample, but differs across countries/country groups. 
5.3 Additional analyses 
This sub-section presents the results of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of the main 
findings. First, endogeneity may occur for two reasons: reverse causality, and correlation of 
the independent variables with the error term. In order to check whether endogeneity may have 
complicated the specified models, the previous regression tests were replicated using one-year 
lagged values for all independent (test and control) variables, except for country, industry and 
year dummies. Using the lagged values alleviates reverse causality bias, as the current 
dependent variable cannot affect any of the lagged independent variables, and helps prevent 
correlation between the error term and the independent variables, since the lagged values 
cannot be correlated with the current-year error term even if they are highly correlated with 
current values of the independent variables. Accordingly, Table 6 reports regression estimates 
using the one-year lagged values of independent variables for the full sample and four sub-
samples. The results are very similar to those reported in Table 5, indicating that the previous 
findings do not suffer from endogeneity, and thus confirming the robustness of the main results. 
--Insert Table 6 about here-- 
Second, an alternative econometric regression technique was used to determine whether the 
above results also held or were sensitive to the use of a different dependent variable. This was 
used to estimate the probability of having a higher environmental disclosure score, since the 
distribution of this variable varied substantially among firms and across countries (see Table 
3). Hence, a binary dependent variable (denoted as E-CODE) was created, equalling 1 if the 
firm’s environmental score was greater than the mean E-SCORE of 26.22% (high 
environmental disclosure) and 0 otherwise (low environmental disclosure). Next, the 
corresponding probit regression models were formulated as an appropriate econometric 
technique for estimating binary dependent variables (0/1). Table 7 presents the results of the 
probit estimates for the full, non-South Africa, South Africa, Middle East and Africa samples 
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(Columns 1 to 5). These show that all probit coefficients for the probability of having a high 
environmental disclosure score (E-CODE) are in line with estimates reported in Table 5. These 
results are consistent because the test variables have the same directional signs and similar 
statistical significance, further supporting the robustness of the main findings. 
--Insert Table 7 about here-- 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the extent to which internal governance structures influenced the 
environmental disclosure practices of 121 MEA firms over the period 2010–2017. It 
contributes new evidence from 11 MEA countries, and thus extends the limited studies 
previously conducted in this region. Unlike previous research, which focuses mainly on the 
effects of a small number of internal governance mechanisms on environmental disclosure 
practices, this study considers the impact of various, largely unexamined internal governance 
mechanisms on firms’ environmental disclosure practices, and hence presents empirical results 
from a more comprehensive model. The study also offers new insights into the relationship of 
interest by integrating the efficiency and legitimation perspectives of neo-institutional theory. 
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the findings. First, the empirical results 
provide strong evidence that MEA corporations complying with good governance practices 
tend to have better environmental disclosure practices than their poorly-governed counterparts. 
Second, the findings indicate that MEA firms’ board characteristics generally have significant 
effects on their environmental disclosure practices, with positive and significant associations 
between board gender diversity, board size, CEO/chairperson duality, audit committee size and 
voluntary environmental disclosures, although board independence is negatively associated. 
Overall, these findings support the efficiency and legitimation predictions of neo-institutional 
theory. 
The results have various practical implications for MEA firms and regulatory and enforcement 
bodies. They reveal that environmental disclosure scores are generally low, but vary 
significantly among firms in the MEA region. This may prompt MEA regulators and 
policymakers to find ways to improve environmental compliance/disclosure practices. They 
might consider establishing independent committees to monitor MEA firms’ implementation 
and disclosure of environmental practices. Internal governance structures are positively and 
significantly associated with environmental disclosure practices, implying that governance and 
environmental reforms should be developed jointly to improve effectiveness. In addition, MEA 
firms with more female directors on their boards tend to have better environmental disclosure 
scores, which may motivate regulators to develop new legislation forcing firms to increase the 
proportion of female directors in their boardrooms to strengthen environmental practices. 
Finally, board independence has a significant negative relationship with environmental 
disclosure scores, which may encourage MEA firms to re-evaluate the adverse effect of 
independent directors on their environmentally friendly activities. 
Although the findings do not suffer from endogeneity and hold when using alternative 
environmental disclosure measures, the study has limitations. First, the sample only covered 
MEA firms for which environmental disclosure data were available from Bloomberg. This 
limitation resulted in significant differences in the distribution of firms, and thus the number 
of firm-year observations across countries. Hence, further research might extend this analysis 
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by incorporating more MEA firms once data become available. Second, as the empirical results 
are only for MEA firms, future studies might explore the effect of internal governance 
structures on environmental disclosure practices in other developing and emerging countries. 
Third, the quantitative approach employed in this research may not provide in-depth insights 
into the drivers of voluntary environmental disclosure practices. Therefore, future research 
might extend this analysis through a qualitative approach (e.g. case studies and interviews) to 
improve understanding of the extent and determinants of voluntary environmental disclosure 
practices. This study provides a valuable benchmark for such future research. 
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Table 1. Sample distribution across countries, time and industries  
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
Distribution across countries 
 
Distribution across years 
 
Distribution across industries 
Country 
Number 
of firms 
Number of 
observations 
 Years 
Number 
of firms 
 Industry Sample (%) 
         
Botswana 1 5  2010 34  Communication 10.7 
Israel  8 45  2011 73  Consumer discretionary  16.2 
Kenya 1 4  2012 77  Consumer staples 21.8 
Mauritius 3 9  2013 81  Energy  2.7 
Nigeria 5 14  2014 87  Health care 6.5 
Oman 2 4  2015 90  Industrials 11.8 
Qatar 2 4  2016 87  Materials 27.1 
Saudi Arabia 2 4  2017 88  Technology 3.2 
South Africa 90 475           Total  100% 
UAE 6 16       
Zambia 1 7       
    Total 121 587       
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Table 2. Research variables and definitions  
Variable   Abbreviation  Definition 
 
Dependent variables     
Environmental disclosure  E-SCORE  Bloomberg’s environmental disclosure score that measures the amount of environmental data which a firm 
reports publicly. The score ranges from 0.1 for firms that disclose a minimum environmental data to 100 for 
those that disclose every data point (e.g., air quality, climate change, water & energy management and 
materials & waste) collected by Bloomberg. 
The probability of having higher 
environmental disclosure  
 E-CODE  A binary variable (0/1) that equals 1 if the firm has high environmental disclosure (with an environmental 
score which is higher than the mean E-SCORE) and 0 otherwise (low environmental disclosure). 
Test variables  
 
    
Governance quality index  G-SCORE  Bloomberg’s governance disclosure score that measures the amount of governance data which a firm reports 
publicly. The score ranges from 0.1 for firms that disclose a minimum governance data to 100 for those that 
disclose every data point (e.g., board independence, structure and tenure, compensation, diversity and 
shareholders’ rights) collected by Bloomberg. 
Female board presentation  FEMDIR  Fraction of female directors to board size. 
Board size   BSIZE  Total number of directors on the board. 
Board independence   BINDEP  Fraction of independent directors to board size. 
CEO/chairperson duality   DUAL  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairperson, 0 otherwise.  
Audit committee   AUDIT  Total number of directors who serve on the audit committee.  
Control variables      
Insider ownership   INSIDER  Proportion of outstanding shares held by insiders.  
Institutional ownership  INST  Proportion of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors.  
Profitability   ROA  Ratio of net earnings to total assets.  
Debt ratio  DEBT   Ratio of total debt to total assets.  
Firm growth   GROW  Market-to-book value ratio. 
Firm size  FSIZE  Natural log of annualised sales revenue. 
Firm age   AGE  Natural log of total number of years since incorporation.  
Country effect   COUNTRY  Country dummies representing 11 different countries in Middle East and Africa. 
Industry effect  INDUSTRY  Industry dummies representing eight different industry classifications based on the BICS. 
Time effect   YEAR  Yearly dummies between 2010 and 2017, which take a value of 1 for the particular year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics by country 
Panel A: Environmental disclosure, governance quality score and board characteristics  
Country  
Firm-year 
observations 
E-SCORE G-SCORE FEMDIR BSIZE BINDEP DUAL AUDIT 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Botswana 5 21.40 19.38 5.82 58.21 57.14 2.40 0.000 0.000 0.00 13.20 13.00 1.64 0.430 0.417 0.09 0.000 0.000 0.00 3.000 3.000 0.00 
Israel  45 20.12 4.88 19.67 43.57 37.5 10.47 0.149 0.125 0.08 10.11 9.00 2.19 0.539 0.428 0.30 0.000 0.000 0.00 4.044 4.000 0.98 
Kenya 4 26.55 26.74 2.99 55.80 57.14 2.68 0.305 0.333 0.06 9.00 9.00 0.00 0.861 0.888 0.05 0.000 0.000 0.00 4.000 4.000 0.00 
Mauritius 9 13.09 10.85 4.80 56.75 57.15 4.53 0.030 0.000 0.05 11.11 11.00 0.60 0.229 0.250 0.04 0.000 0.000 0.00 3.777 4.000 0.66 
Nigeria 14 12.02 8.53 12.02 47.45 48.21 3.55 0.121 0.117 0.09 12.86 13.50 2.74 0.219 0.188 0.12 0.000 0.000 0.00 6.143 6.000 1.17 
Oman 4 18.50 18.71 4.16 53.57 55.36 3.57 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.00 8.00 0.82 1.000 1.000 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.00 4.000 4.000 0.82 
Qatar 4 30.23 24.23 14.77 39.73 41.96 6.74 0.091 0.111 0.06 8.50 9.00 1.00 0.250 0.333 0.17 0.000 0.000 0.00 3.250 3.000 0.50 
Saudi Arabia 4 10.66 4.65 12.01 48.21 48.21 4.37 0.028 0.000 0.05 8.75 9.00 0.50 0.312 0.333 0.04 0.000 0.000 0.00 5.250 5.000 0.50 
South Africa 475 28.14 27.91 13.83 58.72 57.14 6.28 0.210 0.200 0.11 11.60 11.00 2.45 0.593 0.600 0.14 0.008 0.000 0.09 3.716 4.000 0.85 
UAE 16 21.43 21.32 11.80 52.57 52.67 5.97 0.039 0.000 0.05 8.00 8.00 1.86 0.681 0.732 0.15 0.125 0.000 0.34 3.625 3.000 0.89 
Zambia 7 9.19 10.85 2.21 48.98 48.21 4.48 0.194 0.200 0.05 11.57 12.00 1.72 0.313 0.333 0.08 0.000 0.000 0.00 2.857 3.000 0.38 
Total 587 26.22 27.08 14.54 56.72 57.14 8.04 0.191 0.182 0.11 11.34 11.00 2.52 0.573 0.600 0.18 0.010 0.000 0.10 3.792 4.000 0.94 
ANOVA (F) 5.92*** 30.40*** 13.47*** 8.02*** 23.02*** 2.24** 14.16*** 
Kruskal-Wallis (χ2) 55.37*** 131.40*** 111.37*** 73.66*** 125.89*** 21.94** 64.79*** 
Panel B: Ownership and financial characteristics  
Country  
Firm-year  
observations 
INSIDER INST ROA DEBT GROW FSIZE AGE 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean  Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean  Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Botswana 5 0.143 0.097 0.14 0.365 0.435 0.21 0.057 0.054 0.03 0.100 0.109 0.04 1.347 1.217 0.23 4.765 4.646 0.26 3.433 3.434 0.05 
Israel  45 0.002 0.000 0.01 0.315 0.201 0.26 0.043 0.036 0.07 0.247 0.203 0.17 1.805 1.662 0.62 8.035 7.580 1.15 3.548 3.433 0.79 
Kenya 4 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.802 0.806 0.01 0.190 0.191 0.05 0.034 0.021 0.04 3.847 4.221 1.09 7.450 7.470 0.12 2.860 2.862 0.07 
Mauritius 9 0.020 0.017 0.02 0.284 0.318 0.28 0.016 0.017 0.02 0.169 0.180 0.13 1.194 1.321 0.41 4.854 4.847 0.11 4.048 3.497 0.87 
Nigeria 14 0.004 0.002 0.01 0.135 0.044 0.20 0.121 0.132 0.08 0.119 0.104 0.08 3.997 3.786 1.99 7.312 7.338 0.37 3.698 3.980 0.51 
Oman 4 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.543 0.708 0.34 0.104 0.152 0.10 0.143 0.032 0.23 1.599 1.672 0.19 6.932 7.087 0.34 2.658 2.602 0.20 
Qatar 4 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.104 0.100 0.11 0.024 0.030 0.04 0.200 0.062 0.32 1.996 1.950 0.29 6.468 6.409 0.20 2.076 2.012 0.30 
Saudi Arabia 4 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.640 0.614 0.09 0.019 0.011 0.03 0.417 0.499 0.19 1.583 1.552 0.11 8.593 7.972 1.34 3.095 2.917 0.41 
South Africa 475 0.010 0.001 0.03 0.606 0.645 0.30 0.073 0.064 0.13 0.124 0.096 0.12 2.037 1.717 1.12 7.464 7.395 1.09 3.696 3.828 0.79 
UAE 16 0.013 0.000 0.02 0.535 0.59 0.28 0.068 0.050 0.04 0.191 0.189 0.11 1.600 1.691 0.38 7.317 7.940 1.35 2.328 2.250 0.64 
Zambia 7 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.014 0.000 0.04 0.039 0.060 0.03 0.377 0.371 0.07 1.825 1.813 0.23 5.615 5.694 0.14 3.911 3.912 0.04 
Total 587 0.010 0.001 0.03 0.549 0.587 0.31 0.070 0.061 0.12 0.141 0.107 0.13 2.038 1.709 1.13 7.412 7.366 1.17 3.625 3.784 0.82 
ANOVA (F) 11.17*** 12.29*** 3.91*** 9.39*** 7.15*** 12.77*** 8.21*** 
Kruskal-Wallis (χ2) 89.11*** 99.77*** 50.14*** 56.04*** 38.16*** 70.26*** 56.95*** 
*** Significance at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
** Significance at the 5% level (p<0.05) 
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Table 4. Pearson’s correlations and VIF values 
Variables     (1)        (2) (3)       (4) (5)       (6)  (7)        (8)           (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) VIF 
(1) G-SCORE    1.000             1.25 
(2) FEMDIR  0.190** 1.000            1.14 
(3) BSIZE  0.238**      0.058     1.000           1.42 
(4) BINDEP  0.223**  0.240**   −0.073     1.000          1.34 
(5) DUAL  −0.055 0.013   −0.007     0.084     1.000         1.04 
(6) AUDIT    0.056 0.004     0.302**     0.124*   −0.032     1.000        1.22 
(7) INSIDER    0.004  −0.208**   −0.064   −0.157**   −0.032  −0.157**     1.000       1.14 
(8) INST    0.303**    0.168**     0.145**     0.324**     0.104     0.013   −0.162**     1.000      1.31 
(9) ROA  −0.075      0.031   −0.003     0.008   −0.026   −0.010     0.049   −0.001 1.000     1.31 
 (10) DEBT  −0.144**   −0.064     0.027   −0.138**     0.096     0.100   −0.124*   −0.056       −0.133*     1.000    1.13 
 (11) GROW  −0.059 0.038   −0.023   −0.075   −0.033     0.065   −0.018     0.052     0.451**     0.011 1.000   1.31 
 (12) FSIZE    0.096 0.086     0.330**     0.149**     0.045     0.216**   −0.128*     0.164** 0.015     0.118* 0.033 1.000  1.21 
 (13) AGE    0.129* 0.086     0.231**     0.016   −0.030   −0.066   −0.088    0.224** 0.001   −0.101 0.033 0.061 1.000 1.15 
** Significance at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
* Significance at the 5% level (p<0.05) 
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Table 5. Regression results 
The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in the parentheses. All estimations (both WLS and OLS) are 
computed using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions.  
Dependent variable: E-SCORE
i,k,t 
Estimation method:   WLS  WLS  OLS  WLS  WLS 
  Full sample  Non-South Africa   South Africa   Middle East  Africa 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Independent variables           
Test variables           
G-SCORE
i,k,t 
 0.673*** 
(0.1116) 
 0.465*** 
(0.1617) 
 0.536*** 
(0.0933) 
 0.500** 
(0.2302) 
 0.288*** 
(0.10000) 
FEMDIR
i,k,t 
 0.251*** 
(0.0866) 
 0.486*** 
(0.1699) 
 0.125** 
(0.0508) 
 0.416* 
(0.2122) 
 0.230*** 
(0.0656) 
BSIZE
i,k,t 
 0.063 
(0.4203) 
 0.902 
(0.6681) 
 0.554** 
(0.2588) 
 0.369 
(0.9631) 
 0.455 
(0.3160) 
BINDEP
i,k,t 
 −0.136*** 
(0.0438) 
 −0.305*** 
(0.0809) 
 −0.080** 
(0.0403) 
 −0.429*** 
(0.1110) 
 −0.079* 
(0.0430) 
DUAL
i,k,t 
 9.681** 
(3.9047) 
 11.351* 
(5.7788) 
 8.253 
(6.5381) 
 19.381** 
(8.1885) 
 6.989 
(9.7592) 
AUDIT
i,k,t 
 1.410 
(0.9175) 
 3.643** 
(1.6859) 
 0.048 
(0.6705) 
 5.553** 
(2.2087) 
 1.120* 
(0.6657) 
Control variables           
INSIDER
i,k,t 
 −0.108 
(0.1842) 
 −0.356 
(0.3581) 
 −0.662*** 
(0.1298) 
 −0.776 
(0.4857) 
 −0.588*** 
(0.1398) 
INST
i,k,t 
 −0.097*** 
(0.0306) 
 −0.116** 
(0.0541) 
 −0.034 
(0.0229) 
 −0.208*** 
(0.0632) 
 −0.033 
(0.0239) 
ROA
i,k,t 
 −0.227** 
(0.0942) 
 −0.844*** 
(0.2818) 
 −0.078*** 
(0.0207) 
 −0.782** 
(0.3205) 
 −0.111*** 
(0.0353) 
DEBT
i,k,t 
 −0.195*** 
(0.0540) 
 −0.223*** 
(0.0678) 
 −0.143*** 
(0.0490) 
 −0.263** 
(0.1037) 
 −0.178** 
(0.0681) 
GROW
i,c,t 
 1.250 
(1.0665) 
 0.982 
(1.7841) 
 0.458 
(0.4431) 
 1.031 
(0.7312) 
 1.409 
(1.1272) 
FSIZE
i,k,t 
 2.877*** 
(0.7244) 
 5.433*** 
(1.2894) 
 1.573*** 
(0.5575) 
 7.368*** 
(2.0304) 
 5.811*** 
(1.9969) 
AGE
i,k,t 
 4.785*** 
(1.3969) 
 9.011*** 
(2.9692) 
 1.562** 
(0.6687) 
 8.961* 
(5.3023) 
 1.889** 
(0.9334) 
COUNTRY  Yes  Yes  -  Yes  Yes 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  −60.228*** 
(7.9919) 
 −63.871*** 
(15.1238) 
 −34.188*** 
(7.5107) 
 −42.463** 
(20.9045) 
 −25.474*** 
(7.2800) 
No. of observations  587  112  475  78  509 
F-Statistic  42.59***  27.70***  41.63***  8.68***  68.12*** 
R2 (%)  71.48%  79.21%  51.71%  74.96%  75.07% 
*** Significance at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
** Significance at the 5% level (p<0.05) 
* Significance at the 10% level (p<0.10) 
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Table 6. Regression results using lagged independent variables 
The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in the parentheses. All estimations (both WLS and OLS) are 
computed using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions. Independent variables are one-year 
lagged. 
Dependent variable: E-SCORE
i,k,t 
Estimation method:   WLS  WLS  OLS  WLS  WLS 
  Full sample  Non-South Africa   South Africa   Middle East  Africa 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Independent variables           
Test variables           
G-SCORE
i,k,t‒1 
 0.478*** 
(0.1099) 
 0.491** 
(0.1917) 
 0.583*** 
(0.0960) 
 0.305** 
(0.1488) 
 0.201** 
(0.0939) 
FEMDIR
i,k,t‒1 
 0.203** 
(0.0838) 
 0.215** 
(0.0931) 
 0.137** 
(0.0615) 
 0.289* 
(0.1537) 
 0.110** 
(0.0553) 
BSIZE
i,k,t‒1 
 0.244 
(0.4249) 
 0.810 
(0.7941) 
 0.465** 
(0.1875) 
 0.499 
(1.2438) 
 0.376 
(0.3581) 
BINDEP
i,k,t‒1 
 −0.108** 
(0.0441) 
 −0.156* 
(0.0830) 
 −0.082* 
(0.0435) 
 −0.365*** 
(0.1250) 
 −0.089** 
(0.0415) 
DUAL
i,k,t‒1 
 1.969** 
(0.9107) 
 8.708* 
(4.9197) 
 8.122 
(6.8335) 
 7.157*** 
(2.6312) 
 5.577 
(4.8495) 
AUDIT
i,k,t‒1 
 2.058 
(4.5490) 
 2.823** 
(1.2381) 
 0.043 
(0.7651) 
 6.257** 
(2.7933) 
 2.196*** 
(0.7362) 
Control variables           
INSIDER
i,k,t‒1 
 −0.028 
(0.0340) 
 −0.096 
(0.0849) 
 −0.664*** 
(0.1592) 
 −0.645 
(0.4313) 
 −0.666*** 
(0.1584) 
INST
i,k,t‒1 
 −0.3369** 
(0.1674) 
 −0.800*** 
(0.2627) 
 −0.044 
(0.0288) 
 −0.143** 
(0.0612) 
 −0.053 
(0.0445) 
ROA
i,k,t‒1 
 −0.235** 
(0.0987) 
 −0.653** 
(0.3069) 
 −0.093*** 
(0.0233) 
 −0.568** 
(0.2691) 
 −0.090*** 
(0.0331) 
DEBT
i,k,t‒1 
 −0.108*** 
(0.0413) 
 −0.061** 
(0.0264) 
 −0.199*** 
(0.0523) 
 −0.234* 
(0.1353) 
 −0.151** 
(0.0672) 
GROW
i,k,t‒1 
 0.707 
(0.5001) 
 1.298 
(2.1328) 
 0.775 
(0.4765) 
 1.248 
(3.5031) 
 1.018 
(0.8566) 
FSIZE
i,k,t‒1 
 3.692*** 
(0.6493) 
 11.127*** 
(2.1455) 
 1.671** 
(0.6637) 
 8.936** 
(4.2907) 
 3.259** 
(1.5445) 
AGE
i,k,t‒1 
 4.922*** 
(0.9033) 
 14.097*** 
(4.1922) 
 1.699** 
(0.7281) 
 8.113* 
(4.7445) 
 2.573** 
(0.8381) 
COUNTRY  Yes  Yes  -  Yes  Yes 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  −65.300*** 
(6.8841) 
 −78.991*** 
(12.6385) 
 −31.475*** 
(8.2441) 
 −32.236*** 
(8.5055) 
 −23.104*** 
(7.7070) 
No. of observations  455  79  376  56  399 
F-Statistic  63.29***  10.42***  29.15***  14.08***  81.16*** 
R2 (%)  77.99%  79.95%  53.37%  73.59%  78.23% 
*** Significance at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
** Significance at the 5% level (p<0.05) 
* Significance at the 10% level (p<0.10) 
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Table 7. Regression results of probit estimates 
The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in the parentheses. All probit estimations are computed using 
White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions.  
Dependent variable: E-CODE
i,k,t 
Estimation method:   Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit 
  Full sample  Non-South Africa   South Africa   Middle East  Africa 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Independent variables           
Test variables           
G-SCORE
i,k,t 
 0.064*** 
(0.0123) 
 0.075*** 
(0.0208) 
 0.062*** 
(0.0142) 
 0.059*** 
(0.0137) 
 0.060*** 
(0.0144) 
FEMDIR
i,k,t 
 0.034*** 
(0.0072) 
 0.032** 
(0.0156) 
 0.015** 
(0.0076) 
 0.027** 
(0.0129) 
 0.033*** 
(0.0074) 
BSIZE
i,k,t 
 0.039 
(0.0908) 
 0.074 
(0.0605) 
 0.033** 
(0.0142) 
 0.050 
(0.0963) 
 0.027 
(0.0347) 
BINDEP
i,k,t 
 −0.020*** 
(0.0048) 
 −0.015*** 
(0.0052) 
 −0.021*** 
(0.0059) 
 −0.026*** 
(0.0091) 
 −0.029*** 
(0.0063) 
DUAL
i,k,t 
 0.109*** 
(0.0332) 
 0.022* 
(0.0124) 
 0.164 
(0.1576) 
 0.035* 
(0.0187) 
 0.137 
(0.0958) 
AUDIT
i,k,t 
 0.555 
(0.7024) 
 0.299* 
(0.1631) 
 0.065 
(0.0996) 
 0.161** 
(0.0722) 
 0.246* 
(0.1447) 
Control variables           
INSIDER
i,k,t 
 −0.042 
(0.0293) 
 −0.131 
(0.0816) 
 −0.101*** 
(0.0298) 
 −0.056 
(0.0589) 
 −0.118*** 
(0.0347) 
INST
i,k,t 
 −0.005** 
(0.0025) 
 −0.014** 
(0.0067) 
 −0.008 
(0.0333) 
 −0.152** 
(0.0681) 
 −0.002 
(0.0032) 
ROA
i,k,t 
 −0.012** 
(0.0061) 
 −0.022** 
(0.0087) 
 −0.019*** 
(0.0054) 
 −0.010** 
(0.0047) 
 −0.011** 
(0.0056) 
DEBT
i,k,t 
 −0.027*** 
(0.0063) 
 −0.021** 
(0.0098) 
 −0.023*** 
(0.0069) 
 −0.038*** 
(0.0116) 
 −0.024*** 
(0.0070) 
GROW
i,k,t 
 0.077 
(0.0733) 
 0.311 
(0.1911) 
 0.042 
(0.0719) 
 0.123 
(0.1108) 
 0.194 
(0.1527) 
FSIZE
i,k,t 
 0.145** 
(0.0656) 
 0.525*** 
(0.1172) 
 0.244** 
(0.0987) 
 0.644** 
(0.3232) 
 0.347*** 
(0.1329) 
AGE
i,k,t 
 0.242*** 
(0.0936) 
 0.155** 
(0.0728) 
 0.267*** 
(0.0927) 
 0.161* 
(0.0931) 
 0.201** 
(0.0971) 
COUNTRY  Yes  Yes  -  Yes  Yes 
INDSUTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  −4.082*** 
(0.8897) 
 −7.181*** 
(1.5194) 
 −5.453*** 
(1.0263) 
 −10.009*** 
(2.4437) 
 −4.263*** 
(1.0301) 
No. of observations  587  112  475  78  509 
Wald χ2  85.20***  36.94***  68.79***  21.89***  93.87*** 
Pseudo R2 (%)  34.09%  40.38%  32.69%  39.18%  36.05% 
*** Significance at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
** Significance at the 5% level (p<0.05) 
* Significance at the 10% level (p<0.10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
